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17 March 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirements, Indochina, 1971-73

1. The central objectives of US policy in Indochina over the next two years will be to accomplish the safe and orderly withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from Vietnam, and to assure the survival of coherent and functioning, <sup>non-</sup>~~anti-~~Communist governments in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Over the longer term, our primary objective will be to assist those countries in maintaining their independence, political stability, and economic viability. While strong similarities exist in our intelligence needs for South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the latter two -- given their relatively greater internal instability -- pose special problems.

2. In support of these objectives, the US will require intelligence in the following general areas:

- a. Enemy military plans, intentions and capabilities.
- b. Political and economic developments and trends in North Vietnam.

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c. Friendly military plans, intentions, and capabilities.

d. Political and economic developments and trends in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

e. Internal security and subversion in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

3. In Vietnam, some intelligence responsibilities have already been turned over to the South Vietnamese, or are in process of being turned over, as part of the Vietnamization process. Despite intensified training and equipment programs, the GVN intelligence organization lacks qualified personnel, equipment and funds and will not be able to take over the major portion of US intelligence efforts in South Vietnam over the next two years. As a consequence, most of the current intelligence effort will remain unchanged so long as US forces are present and engaging in combat. Even after US forces are fully withdrawn and so long as the war continues, and it remains a US objective to sustain the independence of South Vietnam, our intelligence requirements will remain more urgent than in most other countries where the Communist threat is of lesser degree, and our commitments and prestige are not so heavily involved.

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